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MALINOWSKI'S 'FUNCTIONAL' ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CHANGE[1]

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I. INTRODUCTION

THERE can be no single right analysis of social change. The data are so complex and our tools as yet so crude that we must expect to work with various hypotheses and many types of abstractions. Some will be better instruments of analysis than others, and we must hope that we shall be able to subsume several of these in more comprehensive and consistent bodies of ordered knowledge. I immediately distrust such works as this latest polemic of the late Professor Malinowski's which is written in the strident terms of the one-and-only orthodoxy.

The book is a posthumous compilation of published essays and unpublished notes. Naturally this prevents its being a polished work, but it does not explain away the book's weaknesses. Each published essay shows that Malinowski failed to work out clearly the structure of his own thesis. He is muddled about his basic philosophical and moral assumptions, and his reasoning is illogical and internally inconsistent. He attacks those who do not belong to his elect by distorting what they have said, and then he unconsciously puts forward their views to demolish someone else. Had Malinowski been an isolated student, this book could have passed unnoticed. But it is published with all the weight that has come rightly to attach to Malinowski's reputation, and the acceptance of the editorship by Kaberry shows that Malinowski was the leader of a school of thought. Therefore I have struggled to analyse his book in order to assess what it contributes to our discipline.

I should prefer to begin this analysis by setting out Malinowski's strength, rather than his weakness, but his whole tone is so polemical that I must first clear away the smoke-screen with which he clouds his argument. Therefore I shall discuss his approach to the historical analysis of culture contact (I prefer ' social change '), his conception of the field-situation, his abstractions, and the ' practical anthropology' which he bases on his thesis.

II. MALINOWSKI'S APPROACH TO THE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Malinowski neither analyses logically what historical studies contribute to our understanding of social change, nor does he refer to the works of any leading historian. Instead, he puts forward the views of two of his own pupils who studied African tribes. In demolishing these, he claims that he has disposed of historical interpretation, even though he admits that social change is an historical process. Thus he cites (p. 20) Hunter as setting the task of anthropology to be ' as far as possible to distinguish elements borrowed from European culture from those which were a part of Pondo culture before the coming of the Europeans '. He shows easily that this is an inadequate definition, and that many complexes in Africa cannot

be handled thus.[1] Second, he takes up Mair for arguing that, in Malinowski's words
(p. 27): 'the discovery of maladjustments requires as a starting-point a reconstruction
of the working of these institutions in precontact times'. He objects to the assump-
tion that old times were good, and new times are 'pathological', if that indeed is
assumed by Mair. But what I, as a social anthropologist, protest against is the sum-
mary dismissal of historical analysis in these two doctrines. For without expressing
any judgement on the intrinsic merit of these anthropologists, I can say that it is
absurd to give as 'typical historians' two Africanists, and not to refer to the work
of people such as Mommsen, Gibbon, Halévy, Weber, Maine, Maitland, Marx, the
Webbs, Tawney, the Hammonds, Power, Toynbee, Trevelyan, and many others who
have made major contributions to the understanding of historical processes in social
life. Not even those sociological historians who have concentrated on Africa, such
as Macmillan, Marais, and de Kiewiet are mentioned.

In general Malinowski is completely confused about what history is. He fails to
distinguish the understanding of a culture, derived from knowledge of its history
and the analysis of historical processes, from the significance which their history,
as they know it, has for the bearers of a culture. Malinowski may be right in stating
that the former cannibalism of a tribe is in fact irrelevant to its modern nutrition.
He is not justified in arguing from this, and similar examples, that there is no value
in historical study.

The first basic point he does not appreciate is that every event is the product of
a unique history through which, we assume, there has operated a variety of scientific
laws. Therefore in order to know why an event is as it is, and not something else,
we must know its history. Even in a physicist's laboratory experiment, the bringing
together of selected events and the control of external conditions constitute a particular
history which enables the experimenter to test only those interdependencies he wishes
to determine. An essential section in the report of any experiment is the description of
its set-up, i.e. of its history. The need for historical knowledge is even more urgent
in the humanistic disciplines, which study events whose histories are more com-
plicated and more particular, and which are subject to more numerous and more
varied laws. For we observe that individuals and their material goods, their group-
ings and relationships, persist through changes; and it is the study of their inter-
dependencies which is our field. To analyse these we must study them over a period
of time, and the analysis of change therefore involves historical study within a period
set by the problem. If we neglect this we get a distorted view. For example, in
discussing African warfare Malinowski states (pp. 84-5): 'European occupation . . .
has obliterated the old tribal hostilities.' The facts we have show that these old tribal
hostilities are by no means obliterated, but are largely denied military expression.
In addition, previously hostile tribes may unite against the Europeans. Any historian
would have expected this.

Furthermore, without an historical study we cannot understand the drives which
lie beneath the changes in the relationships of personalities and groups. In a typically
naive statement, Malinowski criticizes the study of archives: 'the paper program
is never the actuality of contact. We have only to look at the Transkei where

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[1] Hunter (Mrs. Wilson) completely abandoned
this point of view in a later book written in colla-
boration with her husband: *The Analysis of Social
Change*, Cambridge, 1945.

the original purpose [of the Glen Grey Acts] was the transformation of the Natives into moderately prosperous small farmers, working their land under a system of individual land tenure, yet as a body still in need of employment, to see that such policies are never realized' (p. 114). Obviously, their failure, if universal, poses an historical problem. A similar problem is dealt with at length in Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*. Malinowski himself shows elsewhere that the Glen Grey Acts failed because of the demand for African labour and the reaction of the Africans in terms of their valuation of land—which itself is an historical analysis. It is certain that the Glen Grey Acts had important effects.

In this particular example Malinowski's obsession against history leads him to a shattering egocentricity. At p. 117 he says of the failure of South African native land policy: ' All these conclusions provide us with a moral [!] lesson, but it is still wisdom after the event. Had our tripartite scheme for the study of culture contact [discussed below] been applied during the earlier periods, it would have provided invaluable material for the framing of such policies as the Glen Grey Acts, the Lands Acts of 1913, and so on.' It might have provided material, but would it, as the context implies, have altered the land policy in South Africa? A Government unmoved by the sufferings of thousands of people is not likely to be moved by the pretty chart of an anthropologist. Knowledge alone cannot make a moral policy; it can as easily serve an immoral one.

I examine now Malinowski's conception of what history is. He argues that the anthropologist is concerned not with ' history dead and buried, but with tradition alive and at work '. The distinction is valid, for psychically people are moved by what they believe their history to be and not by what it was. English schoolboys know the names of Poictiers, Crecy, and Agincourt: how many know the names of the French victories? Yet the French victories kept France independent of England and so affected English history and England. Therefore from another point of view people are affected by what their history actually was: i.e. by history dead and buried. The whole of Britain's history gives her a place in the world which affects her present structure. The Thirty Years War by its material results affected German life for many generations. The Zulu conquest of Natal created relationships with other tribes which still operate, unknown to the people.

This distinction, in itself useful, certainly does not reject historical study which aims to understand processes of change. No one would dispute that ' fictitious ' reconstruction is bad, and all reconstruction is difficult. But the work of historians of Europe shows how much can be done; Eileen Power put flesh and blood on medieval people. The anthropologist, who is working to a smaller time-depth, can use similar material, not only of native informants, but also from official records, books of travellers and missionaries, &c. These may not always be accurate reports of native culture, but their descriptions are by actors in the contemporary scene. Obviously their accounts will not be as good or as comprehensive as those of modern field-workers, but they are often illuminating. The extent to which this reconstruction can be made obviously depends on the records available.

Reconstruction has two purposes. First, it gives one essential part of our understanding of the present—of why things are as they are. Second, it provides data for the analysis of social processes, both in static and in changing societies. There is no

difference in essence between processes of change observed to-day, and those observed in the past, or reconstructed if data are available. Knowledge of processes that have occurred in the past adds to our range of comparative generalization. This is obvious enough, but Malinowski pays it only lip-service. It is true that he grants (at pp. 33–4) some value to historical studies of Greek city-states, &c., and he claims that he himself introduced the biographical study of kinship, an historical technique. Nevertheless, his obscurantist bias against history is patent, for example, in his chiding of Mair: ' A shaking off completely of the historical obsession ' (p. 136, n. 60).

Similar processes may occur at different times and in different societies. For example, some field-workers have noticed that the evangelical drive among Africans has passed from most established churches such as the Anglicans, Presbyterians, Catholics, &c., to sects such as the Seventh Day Adventists and Salvation Army, and above all to Jehovah's Witness and separatist African churches. These convert pagans and adherents of the ' established churches '. This suggests comparison with the types of sects joined by the working-class of England in the early nineteenth century, as discussed by the Hammonds and Halévy, and with the flocking of Russians after the 1917 Revolution to the evangelical churches which had been restricted by the Tsarist régime. In making such a comparison we should have to look at the processes at work, and not only at the complex and incommensurable realities. Moreover, this poses a field-problem in historical terms: the compilation from mission records of the numbers of adherents of the various sects over a period.

Malinowski himself is constantly driven to formulate similar problems in historical terms. Thus he has a section called ' the lines of tribal renegation [!] and integral rebuff ' (p. 158), in which he discusses how Africans, after a first responsive accept-ance of some European influences, are rebuffed by the colour bar and turn back to their own culture. The movement is expressed in separatist churches, renewed loyalty to tribal authorities, and a return to native customs, ritual, and art with heightened value. This is sound enough—and it is historical.

Malinowski's theoretical denial of the value of historical reconstruction is thus contradicted by his constant use of it, wherever he makes a good analysis. We see here not only the necessity to study history in order to observe processes of social change, but also the need to record historical developments in order to understand the latent drives in existing organization, as well as its present form. Historians over centuries have been aware of this, and have tried to formulate general processes. On the whole they have resigned themselves to analysing the unique relationships in their material. It is clear that if we are to formulate processes of change in general terms, we must abstract them from each historical reality. There can be no comparison of the overladen complexity of real events. The problem that remains is: can we compare the processes of change in a variety of societies?

III. MALINOWSKI'S CONCEPTION OF THE FIELD OF STUDY

Malinowski introduces his conception of the field of study by attacking the view which regards the Africans of to-day as an integral part of the modern world. To do this, he distorts the arguments supporting this view. Then, with the inconsis-tency which we found in his use of history, he adopts it in many of his own analyses. I shall briefly demonstrate this and indicate that his concepts make it inevitable.

The view that Malinowski attacks is assumed in the studies of historians (e.g. Macmillan), economists (e.g. Frankel), and psychologists (e.g. Macrone). He attacks it as put forward by Fortes and Schapera. I have already exposed his distortions[1] but have here to repeat the argument, because Kaberry, in editing this book, similarly distorts what I wrote.

Malinowski writes: 'it is now generally agreed upon that Europeans form an integral part of any contact situation. . . . But I think it is pushing a legitimate commonplace too far when it is suggested [by Schapera] that " the missionary, administrator, trader and labour recruiter must be regarded as factors in the tribal life in the same way as are the chief and the magician ". . . . Yet another writer [Fortes] has claimed: " contact agents can be treated as integrally part of the community" '. Malinowski attacks: ' Unfortunately, this type of simplification is not advisable. The treatment of the complex situations of change as one " well-integrated whole ", the " one-entry " approach as we might call it, ignores the whole dynamism of the process. . . . The concept of a well-integrated community would, indeed, ignore such facts as the colour bar, the permanent rift which divides the two partners in change and keeps them apart in church and factory, in matters of mine labour and political influence ' (pp. 14 ff.).

I need not quote more extensively. ' Integral ' becomes ' well-integrated whole ', and then a ' well-integrated community ' meaning ' harmonious '. Similarly, Schapera's statement that White personalities have to be studied *in the same way* as Black, is perverted by reading the words *in the same way* as if they referred to the social position of the personalities, and not to a field-technique. Then obviously the missionary is not socially equivalent to the magician. Again, where Schapera speaks of using White informants on matters which they know about, Malinowski says ' we should [then] have only a slight numerical addition to our informants ': as if an administrator cannot give valuable data on the matters which Africans bring to his office.

Kaberry uses the same technique to dismiss my argument. ' Dr. Gluckman . . . states: " We see that the dominant form of the structure is the existence *within a single community* [Kaberry's italics] of two cooperating colour groups which are differentiated by a large number of criteria so as to stand opposed and even hostile to one another." Dr. Gluckman admits the existence of a colour bar; unfortunately, he does not define the term community. If, however, we take it to mean a territorial group which participates in a common culture, it is difficult to see how it can be applied to the African contact situation, in view of the profound differences of language and culture between the groups involved ' (p. 14, n. 3). If, indeed, one defines *community* as an ethnic group recognizing common values—or as a group of people who believe the earth is flat—or as anything I clearly did not imply it to mean, then I wrote nonsense. It is unfortunate, perhaps, that I used the word *community*: it was the best term I could find to express the fact that there is a large field of interdependence in which individuals of the two colour groups have standardized norms of behaviour to each other. But it is dishonest to give to a word a meaning other than the one I intended, and then to make it the basis for a rejection of my whole analysis. The dishonesty is made manifest in the words: ' Dr. Gluck-

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[1] In my ' Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand ', *Bantu Studies*, June 1940, pp. 168 ff.

man *admits* [my italics] the existence of a colour bar '; whereas in fact my analysis of the situation deals wholly with the colour bar, the opposition of colour groups, and the differences in culture.

We can thus reject Malinowski's initial denial of the existence of a single social body, to use a neutral word, of Whites and Blacks. Nevertheless, Malinowski might still be justified in rejecting the concept as a tool of analysis. Let us examine his own position. He says that the missionary ' cannot " be regarded in the same way as the magician ". . . . He would not be true to his vocation if he ever agreed to act on the principle that Christianity is as "any other form of cult " [Schapera said Christianity has to be studied in the same way as any other form of cult]. . . his brief is to regard all other forms of religion as misguided. . . . Far from leaving other cults side by side in juxtaposition with the message of the Gospels, the missionary is actively engaged in superseding them.' He contrasts similarly administrator and chief. He states that it would be difficult to regard the ' settler and his African neighbor as brethren of a large family ' (p. 17)—and who has said they are?

' Nor can industrial enterprise be regarded as part of a tribal unit. It would be a strange African tribe which would embrace the gold mines of the Rand with their gigantic plant; the stock exchange of Johannesburg, and the banking system stretching from Cape to Cairo. The communication systems, railroads and planes . . . all this is part of culture contact. But the concept of an extended African tribe, into which this could be squeezed in order to produce a unified tribal horizon, falls to the ground as soon as it is stated ' (pp. 16–17).

No one has said that the Rand mines, &c., were within the embrace of an African tribe or could be ' squeezed ' into ' a unified tribal horizon '. We state that the Rand mines and the African tribe which supplies their labour are both parts of a single social field; that the administrator who represents a government in London ruling over settlers and Africans, and the chief who rules over only a tribe whose members are in constant relationships with settlers and with Government, are both parts of a single political body. For example, the son of a Zulu councillor was selected by the Zulu paramount to work for him, a signal honour for the father. The youth ran away home. His father upbraided the youth for spoiling his name with the paramount. The youth retorted that the chief paid him nothing—look at his clothes; the Native Commissioner was better than the chief, since he paid those he employed. Afraid of his father's wrath and desirous of money, the youth ran away to a sugar-cane plantation—it might well have been the Rand mines. He could only flee from the paramount because the latter's writ of compulsion was limited by government. Here we have a right of the chief to call for labour which honours a father, the son desiring money and asserting a ' preference ' for the administrator because he pays, the development of a family conflict, and the solution of the conflict by flight to an enterprise of European capital. I quote this simple example to make explicit our conception of tribal group and Rand mines, of administrator and chief, as parts of a single social field. Indeed, Malinowski himself constantly has to use the conception, though he explicitly denies it. ' Divination and witchcraft found in a town yard are not mere replicas of the genuine African institution. The performance I saw in Johannesburg was African divination, but it was applied to a case of witchcraft turning around the competitions and jealousies of mine employment; the fee was paid in English

money, and the verdict was given in terms which no tribesman would understand'
(p. 22).

But his denial of the existence of this single social body involves him in difficulties
of which he is not aware. This emerges, for example, when he discusses ' the pro-
blems of native diet in their economic setting '. He states (p. 102) that ' the method
of study here, of course, would be based on field work among the Whites who con-
trol Native nutrition, including the research workers in biology, medicine and social
conditions '. He goes on (p. 109) to point out that though mine-labourers are
well fed, the diet of their women and children at home suffers because the men are away
and are not producing food. Cash wages ' on broad and sociological lines ' should
compensate for this. Presumably, the diet of the women and children in the reserves
has to be studied by the biochemist, who is himself studied by the sociologist. The
biochemist thus becomes a factor in the tribal horizon though the administrator is
not. The facts force Malinowski to analyse in terms of a social frame in which all
personalities and groups, Black and White, are in theory mutually interdependent.

Malinowski's inconsistency is not chance: it arises from the weakness of his
theoretical framework. Briefly, in general wherever Blacks and Whites co-operate
he classifies the phenomena as ' processes of social contact and change '; wherever
they conflict he regards them as distinct and ' not integrated '. I am aware that
examples from his writings can be cited against this statement, but these are the
fruits of his inconsistency. Thus at p. 65 he says: 'whenever effective cooperation
occurs, a new form of social organization is engendered: a Native Christian con-
gregation under the supervision and guidance of a White clergy; a mine or a factory
where African labor works under the direction of a White staff; a bush school where
African children are taught by European teachers; an organized system of Native
administration under European control. Thus, what results from impact is not
a higgledy-piggledy assortment of traits, but new institutions, organized on a definite
charter, run by a mixed personnel, related to European plans, ideas, and needs, and
at times satisfying certain African interests.' But he cannot admit ' conflict ' into
his frame of integrated institutions; that is, conflict as an inherent attribute of social
organization, though in practice he uses it. He cannot see that the Rand mines are
a field of conflict as well as a field of co-operation in which Africans, for the money
they desire, assist the Europeans to mine gold. Nor can he see that the separatist
sects, which significantly he pigeon-holes not as ' processes of social contact and
change ' but in a special column, as ' new forces of spontaneous African reintegration
or reaction ', are an aspect of the colour bar plus ' the Native Christian congregation
under . . . White clergy '. Theoretically, he regards the parties to conflicts as not
' integral ' factors in the same field and excludes them from the region of culture
contact.

IV. MALINOWSKI'S PRACTICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Before I go on to clarify the above points in the realm of analysis, I have to
interpolate a section on Malinowski's ' practical anthropology '. This is reduced
to absurdity by his failure to appreciate the significance of conflict. He writes (p. 160):

' I am simply pointing out some of the forces which, wisely controlled, may ensure a
normal and stable development but when mismanaged may lead to dangerous consequences.

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. . . It is clear that wise colonial statesmanship in matters administrative, educational, economic, and religious will do well to assess the potentialities and dangers implied in the relation between things promised and things given. For the disproportion between the hopes raised and the advantages promised to the African when he is induced to cross the line of tribalism and the realization which he receives at the barrier of racial discrimination is the main problem to be considered.

' I suggest that first and foremost it would be well to unify, coördinate, and harmonize various policies. . . . Whenever Europeans plan the settlement of large portions of any colony, segregation and color bar become inevitable. This ought to be remembered by the enthusiastic minority of good-will, who may involuntarily raise high hopes through such doctrines as the Brotherhood of Man, the Gospel of Labor, and the possibilities of assimilation through education, dress, manners, and morals. If, from the outset, it were possible to make quite clear in preaching the gospel of civilization that no full identity can ever be reached; that what are being given to the Africans are new conditions of existence, better adapted to their needs but always in harmony with European requirements, the smaller would be the chances of a strong reaction and the formation of new, potentially dangerous nationalisms.

' But this admonition to the minority of good-will is not all that the anthropologist has to say. He has also to address a few words to that majority of European interests who naturally are not directly concerned with the welfare of the Natives. Big enterprise, organized trade, and most of the administrative agents act primarily under European imperatives. Through their influence the measure of fulfillment is often made inadequate to the promise of the enthusiastic minority.

' The anthropologist must therefore also insist that a substantially increased measure of real and tangible benefits is necessary, in the interests not only of the African but also of the White community. In the long run, African and European interests converge because stable and effective rule by a minority can only be founded on the real satisfaction, prosperity, and welfare of the Native subjects.'

I do not here refer to the moral judgements implicit in this passage. Africans are likely to say that one who merely consigns them to a slightly more attractive compound is an advocate of the Devil; and I for one reject him as advocate of the anthropologists. Here I am interested in the lack of appreciation of the dynamism within the European interests. Here is not even recognition of hard facts. I cannot imagine that a churchman like the late Archdeacon Owen would compromise to the extent of preaching citizenship Grade B and its duties to his beloved people. It is not mere accident that Christianity and Islam—which Malinowski does not mention, though it is gaining at the expense of Christianity in East Africa and is powerful in West Africa—preach brotherhood. What of the Communist Party? Is that to be banned? And all liberal and progressive writings? And is the news of the Eastern people's demands for independence to be kept from the African?

The argument must be taken seriously, since Malinowski bases on this a concept of the ' common factor ' which he raises to the dignity of treatment in a separate essay: ' whenever there is a common measure between the intentions of European impact and the existing needs of the African society, change can lead· to new thriving forms of cultural coöperation . . . the absence of a common factor leads to conflict ' (p. 70).

Politically, in the preceding passage Malinowski's compromise on the common factor appears to me as the anthropologist crawling on his knees to beg some White

groups for a few more crumbs for the Africans, and then asking the missionary to preach a religion that will be an opiate. Sociologically, it shows two weaknesses. It is a mechanical balancing of policies and group-differences, an unawareness of a situation in which not only does the Anglican Synod protest against the colour bar, but also White entrepreneurs of secondary industries demand stabilization, advance of skill, and increase of purchasing power, in opposition to the migrant labour policy of the mine owners, whose interests stem from the conditions of the extractive industries. This unawareness flows from Malinowski's refusal to see conflict as a mode of integrating groups and to recognize that hostility between groups is a form of social balance. This is not so dangerous in the study of static communities and Malinowski, in his Trobriand analyses on sex and repression and on crime and custom, has stimulated the study of conflict. It is most dangerous when studying a changing society, especially when there are inducements for the anthropologist to tone down ' conflict '.

The second weakness arises from the refusal to regard modern Africa as an ' integral ' territorial section of the modern world, and hence the refusal to recognize that though we may isolate for study a reserve, a slum yard, a mine compound, or even a mine, we must allow for the effects of extraneous forces.

This section points to another weakness implicit in Malinowski's scheme. Whenever he tries to frame analytical problems, he poses practical problems in the most naive terms. He begins the book with a statement that there is no difference between theoretical and applied research. He cannot, with his concepts, do otherwise, for, as we shall see, they bind him to the description of unique realities. I have cited two examples already, his conclusions on nutrition in its economic setting and on the conflict between what the African is promised and what he will get. He says (p. 55) that to change an African to a civilized Christian and European citizen ' requires above all substance ': economic security, full social status, and freedom. This may be true, but he should be posing analytical problems: what categories of Africans are converted at various periods, how does this affect their behaviour and their relationships with their kin, their chief, and with Whites, and so on. Similarly, he states (pp. 113 ff.) that the land problem is reducible to ' one which is very simple: whether there is or is not enough land? Hence it is primarily a technical problem '. The simplicity of this statement is breath-taking, but it accords with the sociological unawareness with which he advised missionaries not to preach Christianity, and thought that his three-column charts would have changed South African land policy.

V. Malinowski's Conception of Culture Contact

I have tried to clear the way for an appraisal of Malinowski's own theoretical framework. After describing certain impressions of modern Africa, he continues (p. 64):

' The African world of contact and change consists of three distinct orders of cultural reality: the African, the Western, and that of transition. Each of these orders is subject to a specific determinism of its own. . . . At the same time, all three orders or phases are related to or dependent on each other. The impact and initiative come from the organized forces of Western civilization. They are directed onto the largely passive tribal resources which respond to contact with adaptation or conflict. This process of reaction, positive or

negative—the interaction between Black and White, between Western Culture and tribalism —covers the field of contact and change. Between the two boundaries of color bar on the one side and the dead weight of tribal conservatism on the other there lies the no-man's-land of change. This is not a narrow strip but really embraces most of what is going on in Africa. As yet it is but partly accomplished; adaptation is imperfect and piecemeal; conflict is open or concealed; and at times also there is fruitful coöperation or else disorganization and decay.'

Later I shall examine the threefold research scheme he bases on this. Here I analyse the theoretical implications.

Malinowski has to see modern Africa in these three distinct phases. He is concerned with culture, 'the whole body of implements, the charters of its social groups, human ideas, beliefs and customs' (p. 42). Then when Whites landed in Natal, how was their culture in contact with Zulu culture? And how to-day can Zulu culture be said to be in contact with the culture of London? Malinowski logically argues that wherever Whites and Blacks co-operate, we are presented with a 'third cultural reality, the zone of contact and change, subject to its own determinism'. It is a *tertium quid*, not explicable by either of the flanking White or Black cultures.

Let us examine the application of the framework to a particular set of phenomena. Malinowski describes (p. 23) the establishing of a mine in Africa:

'Once the new industrial venture is organized, we have a complicated European enterprise, essentially dependent on African labor and resources, a phenomenon which can no more be dissected into bits African and European. It cannot be understood either as a whole, or yet in any of its component parts, in terms of European or African prototypes. There is no European prototype for color-bar legislation or practice; for recruiting on reserves; for the method of unemployment insurance by throwing back superfluous labor onto the tribal areas in times of slump. . . . What really takes place is an interplay of specific contact forces: race prejudice, political and economic imperialism, the demand for segregation, the safeguarding of a European standard of living, and the African reaction to all this. . . .

'African labor differs from European labor legally, economically, and socially. At the same time this labor cannot be related in any way to African tribal economics. The scale of payments, criminal sanctions for contracts, pass laws and diet problems which occur in South Africa cannot be understood in terms of the European or of the African parent cultures.'

Malinowski must adopt this point of view for in fact the real differences are as marked as he describes: here is European culture, here is African culture, and here is 'the *tertium quid* of contact'. He remains bogged in description of the separate phases. This prevents his observing certain significant similarities, which are present in the patent differences he describes.

1. The mine is organized for work on the same principles as a gold mine anywhere: manager, foreman, labourers, &c. It is irrelevant if the unskilled labour is European, African, Malayan, or Chinese. Similarly, from some points of view it is irrelevant that southern Africans do not become capitalists while Chinese and Indians do, though this produces impórtant variant results.

2. The beginnings of industrialization in every country have been marked by

migratory labour, since the demand for labour in towns must draw on the rural population. For this purpose, it is irrelevant whether the labourer is brought by the Native Recruiting Corporation from an African village to the Rand, or by a blackbirder from a Polynesian island to Queensland, or from a Russian *mir* to the Don mines, or from Ireland to Birkenhead. The enclosing of land in England, like the taking of African land, drove man to the towns. Here again local factors produce variant effects. In South Africa, the Zulu with their limited wants and sufficient land wished to move for a short while only to earn money: this met the needs of gold-mining. But Zulu have become urbanized, as the Irish remained in Birkenhead.

3. Conditions in Africa allow superfluous labour to be thrown back on the reserves in periods of slump. From the viewpoint of capitalist enterprise, this resembles the throwing of superfluous English labour on the dole, or superfluous American labour into public works. The differences are significant, but beneath them a similar process may be seen.

4. The colour bar in Africa has its parallel in Europe in the struggle by trade unions of skilled workers against dilution of labour. British men opposed the entry of women into industry in fear lest they should lower men's standards of living; men teachers resent the employment of married women; British workers hated the undercutting Irish, and Californians the undercutting Okies. One aspect of the colour bar in Africa—of course, by no means the only aspect—is that it marks the struggle of entrenched workers against dilution.

5. There is no parallel in modern Europe to the pass-laws. European workers are bound by economic necessity: so are urbanized Africans: so are African migrant labourers. But the last have a little choice between remaining in the reserves and going to the labour centres—hence the recruiting which Malinowski cites as 'new'. It is not a fully effective choice, for in many reserves, even if Africans can grow their food, they cannot get money for their food and taxes. W. M. Macmillan has stressed the similarity between the restrictive legislation on Africans and many of the poor-laws of Elizabeth's reign. Tsarist Russia had 'cards of identity' and it would be profitable to compare the way in which the police handled the relevant laws, with what happens in the 'similar' situation in Africa. Passes and penal sanctions tend to bind the African to a particular master, as apprentices and slaves were bound in European history.

6. A variant of migrant labour from the reserves in South Africa is migrant labour of African labour tenants, bound to work six months in a year for the farmer on whose land they live. Statute has been piled on statute to keep these tenants bound to their farmers. All are unsuccessful, for they operate against the dominant movement from country to town. Similar legislation has also occurred in the history of Europe.

This short analysis makes it clear that by concentrating on the particular cultural reality we cannot see the comparable aspects. If we treat the mine and the tribe as parts of a single field, we see that within all the areas where it operates capitalist enterprise produces similar results, i.e. it has an autonomy of its own, in Europe, America, Asia, Australia, and Africa. What actually occurs in each area is affected by local variations, and the variant aspects also have to be studied. Africans now tend to leave paganism and the established churches for the 'curious' and separatist

sects: so did British workers in the early nineteenth century. Some of the African separatist sects include belief in witchcraft; the British sects did not. In similar situations similar processes operate, but each has its variants.

Malinowski considers the urban areas of Africa to be 'a new cultural reality with its own determinisms'. It is impossible, in Malinowski's terms, to set lines for studying so-called tribalized and detribalized Africans. In his framework these categories of people live in different 'cultural realities'. It is obvious that even though they may be the same people their behaviour is situational, so that from some points of view they can be treated as different individuals. This cannot give us a full analysis of their behaviour. If we conceive the tribal and urban areas to be one social field, we say that as soon as an African moves from a reserve to an urban area he is 'detribalized' in the sense that he comes under White authority without his chief, he works in different ways, he associates with different types of individuals, &c. But he is still tribalized, for of course he does not cease to be influenced by tribal culture. To understand his behaviour we must study: how far does he act under urban and industrial influences, common to all urban areas throughout the world? e.g. in forming civic leagues, trade unions, &c. How far is his behaviour determined by poverty, lack of skill, and other characteristics which he shares with workers elsewhere in capitalist countries? How far does urbanization under segregation in Africa (but not peculiar to Africa) control his actions, and his separate civic status under different laws? What are the effects of his contacts with the White group? And how far do his tribal culture and his allegiance to his tribe still affect his behaviour?

Thus we see that Malinowski's conception of the field in terms of culture leads him to the stultifying scheme of three separate cultural phases, each distinct, each unlike the others. This is correct, if we look at the actual realities: the natives' barracks at the Rand mines and an Alaskan gold-mining village are not the same. But, as we have seen, it is incorrect to deduce from this, as Malinowski does, that one cannot dissect these real phenomena to show that they share some characteristics, just as a whale and a sheep are both mammals. Malinowski argues that they are so unlike that each of them must be separately described.

VI. Malinowski's 'Institutions' in Culture Contact

Malinowski's conception of culture contact as occurring between 'institutions', organized systems of human activities, shows the same weaknesses. His unit of culture is the 'institution', 'a group of people united for the pursuit of a simple or complex activity; always in possession of a material endowment and a technical outfit; organized on a definite legal or customary charter, linguistically formulated in myth, legend, rule, and maxim; and trained and prepared for carrying out its task' (pp. 49–50). The institutions are related to basic human psychological and physiological needs and he specifically denies (at p. 42) that sociology can be kept apart from the study of these. Culture conditions the individuals to amalgamate nature and nurture. To feed and enjoy sex, to be warm and protected, are needs that animals satisfy directly, but human beings only in co-operation conditioned by the whole external and transcendent apparatus of culture, including the symbols of language and ritual. He establishes a hierarchy of instrumental imperatives to

satisfy these needs and other needs derived from them, from the conditioning to a manner of sexual intercourse to the diathesis established by religion or magic. Each institution—economic, political, &c.—relates to a need.

When he proceeds to study culture contact, he logically concludes: ' all sociologically relevant impact and interaction is organized, that is, it occurs as between institutions. The real agencies of contact are organized bodies of human beings working for a definite purpose; handling appropriate apparatus of material culture; and subject to a charter of laws, rules and principles ' (p. 65). This is sound. But since his theory is formulated on the basis of needs, he follows this with the statement that each western institution ' has to direct its impact primarily upon its indigenous counterpart. . . . The missionary has to supplant the Native forms of belief and worship ', the entrepreneur to use appropriate African labour and resources, the Government to work with the Native chieftainship (p. 65). He bases his practical anthropology on the thesis that ' the concept of common measure or common factor is the direct corollary of our principle that human institutions are commensurable across the dividing line of culture; but that in each of these they fulfill the same function under a different type of determinism '. ' One kind of institution can be replaced by another which fulfils a similar function ' (p. 52). ' The African family and type of marriage are equivalents of European marriage and the family ', &c. (p. 70). Clearly we can compare European and African marriage and even say they satisfy similar needs, but I cannot see that this applies save to a limited extent to the analysis of culture change with its complicated strands of interaction. Certainly it does not justify Malinowski's statement that ' commensurable institutions ' act *primarily* on one another across the division of culture. Not even Malinowski can maintain this in his analyses. For example, he shows that missionary work affects chieftainship, sex morality, economic life, &c. Conversion itself cannot be studied only as the supplanting of one set of religious beliefs by another; it has to be analysed in a complex social situation. Not all Zulu are converted because they feel that Christianity is a better religion than the ancestor-cult. It does not for them respond better to ' the human psychology of thwarted hope, of fears and anxieties ', or provide a stronger affirmation of human immortality (pp. 47–8). More women than men become Christians, more younger sons than elder sons, more unimportant than important people: there are here wide ranges of structural problems. These can be studied, but not the satisfaction of needs which are in fact assumed from the beginning of the analysis.

Malinowski would have accepted the above formulations. I am here opposing his concept of ' the primacy of commensurable interaction ' which can be discarded as useless. It indicates the analytical sterility of the approach from needs, which even becomes misleading when Malinowski expresses it explicitly and makes it the compass of his search for ' the common factor in culture change ' (pp. 64 ff.). The Zulu migrant labourer goes to the mines to earn money to feed and clothe his family: that is one reason why the mine owner develops the mine. Is this a common factor, because both satisfy in the mine their basic needs? It is the centre of their interdependence, and also the centre of their conflicts. The situation is too complex for this reduction. The processes by which the Zulu is induced to want more goods, is driven to work by tax and shortage of land, develops pride in his experiences in

'white country', &c., require a survey of wide social fields, not a reiteration of basic needs.

Malinowski here, as in his more general theoretical writings, concentrates on the relation of institutions to needs and otherwise leaves his analysis of institutions on a descriptive plane without attempting to dissect them into smaller units susceptible of comparative analysis. The institutions, except in the general terms in which they satisfy needs, remain overloaded with reality: we must recount personnel, material apparatus, charter, norms. Since 'the so-called elements or "traits" of a culture do not form a medley ... but are always integrated into well-defined units', he implies that it is wrong to break up these units and abstract parts or aspects of them for analysis. But to generalize we must isolate certain aspects of a situation or institution; real situations and institutions are too complicated for comparative analysis. Four results flow from this.

The first is that his analysis of culture hardly moves from the descriptive plane of the individual and unique. As a technique for getting comprehensive data it is magnificent and that is Malinowski's great contribution to the methods of sociology. It may well prove that this is the most that sociology can do: to produce accurate, detailed, and comprehensive descriptions of cultures in all their complicated interdependence. But this explains why Malinowski poses no comparative problems. I conned the book meticulously but found not one attempt to abstract change from its complicated real context.

Second, his concept of institutions as 'well-integrated units' breaks down in the field of social change. It is probably the dominance of this concept which led him to pervert Fortes and Schapera's 'integral' into 'well-integrated' and then to reject this. It prevents him from fitting in the idea of conflict at all, and stultifies his handling of history. His 'theory' of institutions still provides a chart for field-work: it is useless for analyses of social change. Nowhere does he describe change in any but vague and glib general terms, tied always to a particular and unique reality. In so far as his charts on specific problems have value, it is a descriptive value only.

Third, Malinowski makes no clear analysis of what he means when he says that 'impact occurs between institutions'. It is obvious enough that when an administrator deals with a chief, each represents a set of human institutions, in the sense that they are not simply people, but are social personalities in specific relationship with each other, and with specific interests and values, &c. In this sense also their positions become centres of new 'institutions'. But it is necessary to break up this concept into smaller units if we are to make further analysis.

Fourth, Malinowski frequently repeats that in the social changes that occur when culturally heterogeneous groups are brought into contact, goods and customs do not pass from one group to another, and are not accepted, in isolation. I illustrate this patent fact with an example from my own data. The plough does not just drop into Zulu hands. In the past, most agricultural work was done by the women. Cattle were taboo to women, but cattle had to draw the plough. After initial resistance to the plough, men, freed from their life at the king's military barracks, began to plough; the ritual taboo of the handling of cattle by women and the emphasis on cattle-handling as men's work dominated the rule that garden-work was appropriate to women. We assume that this altered the property relations of men and women:

the relative importance of crops worked by men increased, and though wives re-
tained their own fields, they did not work these themselves, but their husbands or
sons ploughed parts. However, villages got smaller, boys went to school, and
youths to work for Whites. A man might find himself short of help in ploughing,
since the Zulu have one man at the plough and one driving the oxen. This happened
particularly to Christians who built on their own and were anxious to send all their
children to school. They allowed their wives to drive but not to handle the cattle
or the plough. Government enforces dipping. If a man is ill and there is no other
help, a wife or daughter will drive the cattle to the dip. There other men, to keep
her from their cattle, might drive her herd through the dip. Other Zulu, co-operating
in larger groups which always had sufficient male labour, said 'it is all right for the
woman or girl to drive the cattle if there is no boy and provided she is not men-
struating. When the men went to the military barracks in the past, girls had to milk
and herd the cattle. ' Clearly, then, every change sets up repercussions which run,
on paths set by the institutions, through all the institutions. But I must emphasize
that Malinowski has not indicated any techniques of analysis by which these reper-
cussions can be broken into smaller units to allow of scientific generalization. Our
account above remains purely descriptive. The professional anthropologist can
claim that his descriptions are likely to be more accurate and comprehensive than
those of amateurs, and here Malinowski's contribution, in field-work techniques, is
notable. But must we remain on the descriptive plane, or can we pose, in more
general terms, problems arising from the impact of institutions and from changes
running through a system of institutions? This Malinowski has failed to consider,
and it remains one of our major problems. The Americans have grappled with it.

If we examine the field-work of students in modern Africa, almost all of whom
have been influenced by Malinowski, we find that on the whole they produce more
or less good, accurate, and comprehensive descriptions of what has happened, is
happening, and may happen in the future. Correlations are just deeper than descrip-
tion. For example, Richards concludes that the Bemba have not adopted the use of
money in European ways because they had no material property, as the cattle-
owning southern tribes had, to give them ideas of quantity, accumulation, and
exchange value. Even if this be extended, it is little more than description. Thus
I suggested that the Lozi use money in European fashion more than the Zulu do,
though both have cattle, because, unlike the Zulu, they had considerable trade in
their internal economy for which money was a boon. I also drew attention to
Richards's statement that the Bisa fishermen of Bembaland have a better appreciation
of money than the pure Bemba, because they trade a lot. Similarly, anthropologists
say that the dying of the ancestral-cult weakens the chief, that labour migration gives
a man a chance to escape from the authority of his elders, that the increase in situa-
tions of conflict has been met by an increase in charges of witchcraft. In detailed
analyses of this type we have added greatly to general knowledge of developments.
We are even able to predict what will be found in areas not yet studied. Thus on the
basis of work by Evans-Pritchard and Stayt I anticipated that the Government's
ban on open reaction in witchcraft situations would produce, in the tribes I studied,
an increasing use of magic against witchcraft; and we may assume that this is likely
to be true of every tribe in Africa.

There is little doubt that the anthropologist, with his training and techniques and background of knowledge, can know far more about an unstudied area than the people who live in it. Certainly, he can in a very short time acquire a more accurate and complete knowledge. Our relative skill will increase as we gain wider knowledge, refine our techniques, and use statistics more. But while we must be prepared to recognize the possibility that the description of real events and surface comparisons in mainly similar fields, with a few generalizations at a low level of abstraction, may be the limit of our achievements, we can still try to develop our discipline into a science able to correlate the universal aspects of events, independent of a particular cultural reality.[1] For this attempt we must discard Malinowski's 'theoretical' analysis as sterile. His own work remains an invaluable code for field-research.

VII. MALINOWSKI'S CHARTING OF THE 'THREE CULTURAL REALITIES'

Malinowski produces charts to enable us to study changing Africa. He projects 'the three cultural realities each with its own determinism'—a concept which he does not clarify—on to three columns. He allows another column for the 'reconstructed past', another for 'new forces of spontaneous African reintegration or reaction', and later suggests a sixth to cover European culture outside Africa. This multiplication of columns is significant.

Specimen Chart to be used for the Analysis of Culture Contact and Change

	A	B	C	D	E
Europe	White influences, interests and intentions	Processes of culture contact and change	Surviving forms of tradition	Reconstructed past	New forces of spontaneous African reintegration or reaction

What is the value of the scheme? Malinowski gives the chart an almost autonomous methodological merit in the posing and solving of problems. This it has not. For in practice what he does is to examine the reality of modern Africa, and fit what he observes into the various columns. There is no indication than an entry under 'A' automatically poses problems under 'B' and 'C'. In my opinion, the chart might serve at best as a check on the comprehensiveness of field-work, but not as a tool of analysis.

I take an example covered to some extent by his notes on African warfare.

A	B	C
1. European conquest and political control.	1. The new political system as affected by loss of military sovereignty of the African tribe or monarchy, and resultant changes in African organization.	1. African resistance and political submission in tribal memory and reaction.

That is only one of his horizontal columns but it illustrates the type of entry he makes. The chart, if it has universal effectiveness, should cover all problems. I pose one from Zulu history.

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[1] This is what G. and M. Wilson attempted in *The Analysis of Social Change*, op. cit., p. 104, n. 1.

In the 1830's Boer trekkers under Retief came to Dingane, King of the Zulu, to ask for land. They did not then wish to wrest land from the Zulu by force, but to get Dingane's permission for them to take up land in the parts of Natal which Shaka's wars had depopulated. Dingane agreed to allow this if Retief's party attacked and recovered for him cattle he claimed from another chief. Retief did this, but Dingane murdered the Boer party and killed many of the Boers in Natal. Another group of Boers two years later attacked and defeated the Zulu, and confined them north of the Tugela River. Meanwhile, Dingane was ruling tyrannously, and his brother Mpande was able to lead his own following over to the Boers, who assisted him to defeat Dingane and installed Mpande as king. Let us fit these events, or the institutions behind them, into the columns:

A	B	C
1. Boer desire for land, temporary wish to come to peaceful terms with the Zulu.	1. Dingane uses Boers against enemy chief and they agree to be used to gain favour. Dingane murders Boers, and other Boers avenge.	1. Zulu independence and military power, hostility to neighbouring chiefs.
2. Boer military power, and readiness to use enemy fifth column, Mpande v. Dingane.	2. Mpande gets Boer power to support him and rebellion against Dingane is successful.	2. Zululand divided into segments under king and brothers. People use segmentation in rebellions against bad king: support Mpande against Dingane. Mpande ready to use outside power to help him.

Has the sorting-out added to our knowledge and understanding? To some extent it has, for we have simplified the set of historical events which we are attempting to analyse, and they do stand out more clearly. But the sorting-out itself does not give us the interpretation of data, which has been made prior to the sorting: nor, when put together, does column 'B' alone give an analysis of the dynamics of the whole situation. In horizontal column 2, all personalities, Boers, Dingane, and Mpande, appear in every vertical column. There is no major distortion, but I consider that the all-important interconnexions of the columns, which are relationships between social groups and social personalities as operated on by social forces, are better covered by the concept of the social field. Here we have a numerically powerful Zulu military state in hostile relations with another less-powerful native state (the enemy chief). The Boers, numerically less powerful than the Zulu but technically better-armed (400 of them defeated the Zulu army because of mounted mobility and guns), cross the Drakensberg. A social field is established which consists of unlike territorial states—though the Boers, having as yet no territory, are only the outliers of an incipient state. Dingane uses the unlike Boer state as a weapon to defeat his like enemy, Sekunyane, just as Shaka employed the stabbing-spear to overcome the javelin. Then he wipes out the Boers, thus attempting to restore the previous balance. Other Boers (and English) react to avenge: Dingane is defeated and the Boer power establishes in Natal a system of unlike territorial states, Boer and Zulu, opposed to each other. A cleavage in Zululand enables one of the parties, Mpande, to find Boer support, as he might have found support from another chief. So the deposed Lozi king, Mwanawina, came with a party of *Mazungu* (it is not

even known if they were Portuguese, Arabs, or half-castes) to regain his throne from Lewanika. The Boers use the Zulu cleavage to weaken the Zulu state further and install a friendly rather than a hostile king. It is forty years before the Whites are powerful enough to subjugate the whole Zulu state.

It seems manifest to me that it is most profitable to treat the situation in Natal in 1836–40 as a single social field in which there is mutual interaction throughout, e.g. in Dingane's use of the Boers against his external enemy Sekunyane; in Mpande's use of the Boers in his internal revolution, based on a cleavage in Zulu social organization; and in the advantage taken by the Boers of that cleavage.

I have temporarily isolated Natal at 1836–40. Clearly, a full analysis requires consideration of the drives which brought the Boers to Natal: so that the field of reality in which these events occurred is extended in space-time to the Cape with its own conflicts which produced the Great Trek. Similarly, a full analysis would refer in greater detail to the history which produced the war between Dingane and Sekunyane and the cleavage of Zulu in attachment to Dingane and Mpande: so that the field of reality in which these events occurred is extended in space-time to the whole creation of the Zulu nation under Shaka. Thus in reality, events in the Cape are brought into interaction with events in Zululand and with its history: for the legislative measures which precipitated the Greak Trek enabled Mpande to get Boer help to rebel successfully against Dingane. But though these legislative enactments helped to give victory to Mpande rather than to Dingane, they are sociologically irrelevant to the cleavage of Zulu society into potentially hostile segments attached to brothers of the royal family, and to the process by which Zulu used this segmentation to get rid of a tyrant king and install a brother in his place: i.e. the process by which they defended the values of kingship in rebellion against a bad king. For in this analysis it is partly irrelevant who won the battle. To that extent, Malinowski would be justified in classifying the cleavage under ' C ' rather than ' B ', though in practice I am certain he would have put these events under ' B '.

I hope I have indicated how much more fruitful it is to conceive this set of events as a single field, rather than as ' three cultural realities '. We have seen that this also applies to the establishing of industrial enterprise in Africa. The three columns have as little value as the extra flanking ones he adds. It is significant that not one of his pupils has published an analysis in these terms.

One advantage of the concept of the single field is that it does away with sterile disputes about whether or not an administrator is an integral part of modern political organization. We have seen that Malinowski rejects the concept in a distorted form and then frequently uses it himself, as when he discusses divination in an urban slum-yard. I have analysed the political structure of modern Zululand[1] to show that though chief and administrator co-operate in routine administration, and under the pressure of the force of government, in many ways they are opposed. The administrator stands for one set of values, some of which are desired by many Zulu, the chief for another set. The chief represents tribal history and values; he is related by kinship to many of his people; he lives his social life with them. Above all, he leads their opposition to European innovations and rule. Under Malinowski's scheme, the routine co-operation is classified under ' Contact ', and the kinship-links and

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[1] See my essay in *African Political Systems*, edited Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, Oxford, 1940.

opposition under 'tribal reaction'. But all form a coherent complex about the chief. The Zulu express this by the antithesis: 'the administrator has only the prestige of his office; the chief has the prestige of blood'. The value of the chief's position in the kinship system comes also from the fact that the administrator has not got any position in the system and lives across the colour bar. But many individual Zulu turn to the administrator to gain personal advantages, and, as we have seen with the runaway youth, by some values prefer him to the chief. From the point of view of the individual Zulu the administrator has no place in the kinship system and little in social life, though he enters these in, e.g. law cases. The chief has a place in both.

I break off the analysis abruptly, for I cannot here elaborate other theoretical frameworks. I have tried to indicate that whatever our ultimate abstractions may be, we may best conceive the situation to be studied as a field of interdependent events, on the lines set out in African sociology by Fortes, Schapera, and others. We may isolate zones of the field for analysis, but we have to allow for the operation in one zone, of events emerging from all others.

VIII. Conclusion

This is a bad book. That is its only merit, on the principle stated by Descartes. It is a tragedy that it should have been published to spoil Malinowski's well-merited reputation, based on his own field-work and his general contribution to social anthropology. His 'theory' does not bear examination from any point of view. It is analytically sterile, and it ends in the worst kind of practical anthropology: welfare work without morality, based on naive oversimplification. The problems become: Is there enough land? Is there enough food? Are there more prostitutes? We need no discipline of social anthropology.

It is also a humbling book. For if, on the positive side, Malinowski's thesis remains descriptive, no social anthropologist has yet put forward an alternative. The Marxists have a theoretical framework. Among ourselves the Wilsons have tried to formulate one. But we have still to establish a right to maintain that we are more than good recorders of contemporary events.

Résumé

L'ANALYSE 'FONCTIONNELLE' DU CHANGEMENT SOCIAL

Cet article évalue le livre posthume du Professeur Malinowski, *The Dynamics of Culture Change*. L'auteur conclut qu'il vaut très peu. Il critique la condamnation de Malinowski de l'analyse historique, car elle est basée ni sur une évaluation du travail d'historiens reconnus, ni sur une estimation bien considérée de ce que contribue une étude d'histoire à notre connaissance des faits sociaux. Il démontre que la critique malinowskienne de ceux qui considèrent que l'Afrique soit un seul terrain social interdépendent s'est fondée sur des sens forcés de leurs propos. Ensuite l'auteur essaie de démontrer que l'idée de Malinowski que l'Afrique moderne se compose de trois réalités culturelles n'est que partielle et infructueuse. De plus, cette théorie contient des faiblesses qui mènent inévitablement à ce point de vue. Au mieux, c'est une technique descriptive. Par conséquent Malinowski, incapable de poser des problèmes analytiques, pose sans cesse des problèmes pratiques, en des termes assez naïfs; il semble ignorer les conflits implicites dans la situation, car sa théorie ne peut admettre l'existence du conflit comme une des bases de toute relation sociale.